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Abstract. Recent literature in the last Maximum Entropy workshop introduced an analogy 
between cumulative probability distributions and normalized utility functions [1]. Based on this 
analogy, a utility density function can de defined as the derivative of a normalized utility 
function. A utility density function is non-negative and integrates to unity. These two properties 
of a utility density function form the basis of a correspondence between utility and probability, 
which allows the application of many tools from one domain to the other. For example, La 
Place’s principle of insufficient reason translates to a principle of insufficient preference. The 
notion of uninformative priors translates to uninformative utility functions about a decision 
maker’s preferences. A natural application of this analogy is a maximum entropy principle to 
assign maximum entropy utility values. Maximum entropy utility interprets many of the 
common utility functions based on the preference information needed for their assignment, and 
helps assign utility values based on partial preference information. This paper reviews maximum 
entropy utility, provides axiomatic justification for its use, and introduces further results that 
stem from the duality between probability and utility, such as joint utility density functions, 
utility inference, and the notion of mutual preference.  
INTRODUCTION 
In many decision situations, we are faced with multiple and conflicting attributes. 
When the decision situation is deterministic, each decision alternative is described by 
a single prospect (consequence). The problem of choosing the best decision alternative 
is that of ordering the prospects present or, alternatively, assigning a value function 
over the attributes of each prospect. The optimal decision alternative is the one that 
has the largest value as determined by the value function or the highest order in the 
ranked list. A normative justification for the order requirement is that a decision maker 
who cannot order the prospects is vulnerable to being a “money pump” (we would 
choose prospect A over prospect B, but also prospect B over prospect A, and be 
willing to pay money to move from one prospect to the other) 
When uncertainty is present, a decision alternative is characterized by several 
prospects and a probability distribution representing the probability of their 
occurrence. In this case, the rank order of the prospects alone is insufficient to 
determine the optimal decision alternative, and the Von Neumann and Morgenstern 
utility values need to be elicited. [2]. To elicit these utility values, a decision maker is 
first asked to order the prospects of the decision situation from best to worst. Once the 
order is provided, the next step is to assign a utility value for each prospect. For any 
three ordered prospects, , the decision maker assigns a probability,1 2P P P; ; 3 π , for 
which she is indifferent to receiving  for sure and a deal where she would receive  2P 1P
with probability π  and  with probability 3P (1 ).π−  If the utility values of  and  
are one and zero respectively, then the utility value of , also called the preference 
probability of ,  will be equal to 
1P 3P
2P
.2P (1) (1 )(0)π π π+ − =  The higher the prospect is in 
the ranked list, the larger is the utility value assigned to it. The optimal decision 
alternative is now the one, which has the highest expected utility for its prospects.   
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The normalization of the utility values discussed above leads to an analogy 
between utility functions and cumulative probability distributions. Our goal in this 
paper is to review the analogy between utility and probability, and to draw on the 
applications of this analogy to the maximum entropy principle and to many other 
concepts of information theory. The main requirement for this analogy is that the 
decision maker can provide the complete preference order for the prospects of the 
decision situation she is facing.  
UTILITY ASSIGNMENT FOR ORDERED PROSPECTS  
We start this section with the definition of a utility vector for a set of K ordered 
prospects of a decision situation. A utility vector contains the utility values of the 
prospects starting from lowest to highest. With no significant loss of generality, we 
will assign a utility value of zero to the least preferred prospect, u , and a value of one 
to the most preferred prospect, u
0
(we ignore the case of absolute indifference 
between the K prospects). The utility vector has K elements defined as  
 
                  U .                (1) 0 1 2( , ,......., ......., ,1)Ku u u −
  
Any utility vector of dimension K can be represented as a point in a K-2 
dimensional space in the region defined by 3 2K Ku u− −≤ ≤ . We will 
call this region the utility volume. An example of a two-dimensional utility volume is 
shown in figure (1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1. A 2-dimensional utility volume. 
 
   The second definition is the utility-increment vector, U∆ , whose elements are equal 
to the difference between the consecutive elements in the utility vector. The utility-
increment vector has ( elements defined as 1)K −
 
                   1 2 1 2 1 2 3( 0, ,......,1 ) ( , , ,...., )K KU u u u u u u u u 1− −∆ − − − = ∆ ∆ ∆ ∆ .       (2)          
 
Note that all elements of ∆  are greater than or equal to zero and sum to one.  
Therefore, any utility-increment vector can be represented as a point in a (K-1) 
dimensional simplex 
U
1
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K
i
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 0= ≥ ∑ . These two properties of the utility 
increment vector over the simplex form the basis of the analogy between probability 
and utility and will be used further in this paper. We will refer to this simplex as the 
utility simplex. For example, a 3-dimensional utility simplex is shown in figure (2).  
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FIGURE 2. A 3-dimensional utility simplex. 
 
   Note that all points in the utility volume or the utility simplex satisfy the decision 
maker’s preference ordering of the prospects but assign different utility values to 
them. In other words, knowledge of the preference order alone tells us nothing about 
the location of the utility vector over the utility volume or the utility increment vector 
over the utility simplex. If all we know about the decision maker’s preferences is the 
ordering of the prospects, it is reasonable to assume that the location of the utility 
increment vector is uniformly distributed over the utility simplex. This is also the 
maximum entropy distribution over the simplex. The uniform distribution over the 
utility simplex implies that the location of the utility increment vector is determined by 
a Dirichlet distribution whose K-1 parameters are equal to one. This is in turn implies 
the following three propositions described in [1]. 
Proposition 1: Marginal Distributions of the Utility Vector 
   The maximum entropy marginal distributions for the utility values of a set of K 
ordered prospects are the family of Beta distributions, 
. ( , 1),   1,.... 2Beta j K j j K− − = −
   Given the marginal distribution for each element in the utility vector, it is known 
that the logical assignment of each utility increment value is the mean of its marginal 
distribution [3].  The mean of a ( , 1)Beta j K j− − distribution is equal to ,
1
j
K −  and is 
the utility value you would assign to each prospect, j. The utility values for prospects 
j=0 and j=K-1 are deterministic with values 0 and 1 respectively. 
 
Proposition 2: Marginal Distributions of the Utility Increment Vector 
   The maximum entropy marginal distributions for the elements of the utility 
increment vector have identical maximum entropy marginal distributions, 
.  (1, - 2)Beta K
 
      Given the marginal distribution for each element in the utility increment vector, it 
is known that the logical assignment of each utility increment value is the mean of its 
marginal distribution [3].  The mean of a  distribution is (1, - 2)Beta K 1
1K − . We 
now have a maximum entropy assignment for the location of the utility increment 
vector and are ready for proposition 3 below.  
 
Proposition 3: Utility Increment Vector Assignment 
   The maximum entropy assignment for increments in the utility values of a set of 
 ordered prospects yields identical increments in utility values equal to K 1
1K − .   
For example, if we have a decision situation with five ordered prospects, 
, the maximum entropy assignment of the utility increment vector 
is  and the maximum entropy assignment of the utility 
vector is U . Note that using the definitions of utility volume and 
utility simplex, as well as the maximum entropy uniform joint distribution, we have 
made an unbiased assignment of utility values for five prospects when only the 
preference order is known. Note also that this unbiased assignment gave equal 
increments in utility values.  
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Now we are ready for the first application of our utility-probability analogy: to 
assign unbiased utility values when only the order of the prospects is available. We 
mean by “unbiased” utility values, those that do not lead to arbitrary assumptions of 
preference information that is not available. 
THE PRINCIPLE OF INSUFFICIENT PREFERENCE 
In the previous section we illustrated how to assign utility values for K prospects of 
a decision situation when only the preference order is available. Now we show how to 
work through the same problem using our utility-probability analogy. The analogous 
problem in probability land is to assign a probability to the outcomes of a discrete 
random variable when no further information is available. This problem dates back to 
Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason. Laplace suggested that we assign equal 
probabilities to all outcomes unless there is information that suggests otherwise. The 
utility-probability analogy then suggests a principle of insufficient preference, which 
can be stated as follows: when only the preference order of the prospects is known, we 
assign equal increments in utility values unless there is preference information that 
suggests otherwise. Note that the principle of insufficient preference provides the 
same assignment of utility values as suggested by proposition 3 above.  
The principle of insufficient preference assigns utility values for discrete ordered 
prospects. In many cases, however, we would like to assign utility values over a 
continuous domain. In the next section we will extend our analysis to the continuous 
case and present an additional element to our utility probability analogy: a utility 
density function.  
UTILITY FUNCTIONS AND UTILITY DENSITY FUNCTIONS 
In the continuous case the utility vector has an infinite number of elements tracing 
a utility curve over the domain of monetary prospects. The largest value is still one 
and the lowest value is zero corresponding to the utility values of the best and least 
preferred prospects respectively. A utility curve thus has the same mathematical 
properties as a cumulative distribution function. The utility-increment vector is now 
the derivative of the utility curve and represents a “utility density function”, 
which is analogous to a probability density function in that it is non-negative and 
integrates to unity.  
( ),u x
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Our problem of assigning utility values for continuous prospects of a decision 
situation, when partial preference information is available, is now equivalent to that of 
assigning an unbiased utility density function for the ordered prospects. The latter 
problem is analogous to the problem of assigning prior probabilities to a continuous 
random variable when only partial information is available.  
In this paper we will generalize the utility assignment problem and present a 
maximum entropy approach for the assignment of utility values when only partial 
preference information is available. First let us discuss the entropy of a utility function 
and its interpretation.  
THE ENTROPY OF A UTILITY FUNCTION 
Having defined the notion of a utility density function, it is natural to extend our 
analysis to the entropy measure applied to a utility function, and discuss its 
interpretations.  The differential entropy term applied to a utility density function is  
 
 ( ) ( ) ln( ( ))h x u x u x dx= −∫                                   (4) 
Let us take, as an example, an exponential utility density function over a bounded 
domain [a, b]. We have 
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where γ is the decision maker’s risk aversion coefficient.  
As 0γ → , the decision maker becomes risk neutral (he values uncertain deals at 
their expected value). Using L’hopital’s formula, we can also show that 
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The utility density function approaches a uniform density and the entropy of the 
utility function thus achieves its maximum value of ln( )b a− . Note that the uniform 
utility density function matches the principle of insufficient preference discussed 
earlier as it provides equal increments in utility values for equally spaced prospects. 
The utility function that corresponds to this uniform utility density function can be 
obtained by integration and is linear.  
The linear utility function is thus the maximum entropy utility function over a 
continuous bounded domain. 
 
As γ → +∞ ,  
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The utility density function converges to an impulse utility density function and the 
entropy approaches a minimum value of negative infinity showing less “spread” in the 
utility density. The impulse utility density function is the minimum entropy utility 
function and integrates to a step utility function. 
 
As γ → −∞ ,  
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The utility density function converges again to an impulse utility density function, 
and the entropy approaches a minimum value of negative infinity. This is the other 
extreme where the step in the utility function occurs at the upper bound.  
The step utility function is thus the minimum entropy utility function and 
corresponds, in this example, to cases of extreme risk aversion or risk seeking 
behavior.  
 
Figure 3 shows an example of two exponential utility density functions for different 
values of γ and different entropy values. 
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FIGURE 3. (a) Utility density function for small values of γ is approximately uniform showing large 
spread. (b) Utility density function for large values of γ converges to an impulse utility density 
showing less spread and integrates to a step utility function. 
 
A step utility function appears often in behavioral decision making literature and is 
known as the aspiration utility function. Simon [4] suggested that individuals could 
simplify decision problems by having binary goals: satisfactory if the outcome is 
above the aspiration level or unsatisfactory if it is below it. 
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FIGURE 4. Aspiration (Minimum Entropy) Utility Function 
The interpretation of entropy for utility functions is thus a measure of spread about 
a decision maker’s aspiration level. Aspiration utility functions have the least entropy 
in their utility density functions showing binary preferences, while uniform utility 
density functions have the highest entropy showing smoother utility functions that 
vary gradually over a bounded domain.  
MAXIMUM ENTROPY UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
 Now we will make use of the concept of the entropy of a utility function and 
present a method to assign “unbiased” utility values based on the partial preference 
information we know about the decision maker. By partial preference information, we 
mean any information that includes the complete preference order of the prospects but 
does not include knowledge of the complete utility values. 
In the probability domain, Edwin Jaynes [5] proposed the maximum entropy 
principle suggesting the use of a probability distribution, which has maximum entropy 
subject to whatever information is known. In an analogous manner, we defined the 
maximum entropy utility principle, [1], that suggests the use of the utility function (or 
utility vector) whose utility density function (or utility increment vector) has 
maximum entropy subject to whatever preferences are known. This result is an 
extension of the principle of insufficient preference described earlier.  
Maximum entropy utility provides an interpretation for many of the utility 
functions used in practice based on the preference information constraints needed for 
their assignment. For example when only bounds on the domain of continuous 
outcomes are available, the maximum entropy utility density function is uniform and 
integrates to a risk neutral utility function as we have discussed earlier. When the first 
moment of the utility function is known over a positive domain, the maximum entropy 
utility function is exponential with the first moment equal to the risk tolerance. This 
provides us with a new interpretation for the first moment of an exponential utility 
function over a positive domain. When the first and second moments are known, the 
maximum entropy utility function over a continuous domain leads to the famous S-
shaped prospect theory utility function [6]. 
Maximum entropy utility presents a method to assign unbiased utility values when 
partial preference information is available. For example, the maximum entropy utility 
function given knowledge of some utility values leads to a piecewise linear utility 
function that passes through the given utility points.  
UNINFORMATIVE UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
Much of the research on uninformative and entropic priors for probability functions 
can be translated through our utility-probability analogy into similar research on 
uninformative utility functions. For example, when Jeffreys’ [7] uninformative prior, 
1( ) , 0u x x
x
= > is used as an uninformative utility density function, it leads to the 
famous logarithmic utility function that is used very often to represent the decision 
maker’s preferences in the literature.  
ATTRIBUTE DOMINANCE UTILITY FUNCTIONS 
In this section we present the extension of the previous analysis to multiattribute 
utility functions with ordered attributes. We assume that ( ,min min )x y is the least 
preferred prospect and is most preferred. Furthermore we will assume that 
the values of 
max max( ,x y )
( , )x y are arranged such that for any 0 1 0, , , 1x x y y  we have 
 
 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0( , ) ( , )  and ( , ) ( , ) x x x y x y y y y x y x y> ⇒ ∀ > ⇒ ∀; ; x
1
             (9) 
 
With no loss of generality, we will use a normalized multiattribute utility function, 
, over the attributes in all of our analysis. i.e.  ( , )xyU x y
 
 0 ( , )xyU x y≤ ≤                                           (10) 
 
Based on this formulation, we have 
 
 min min max max( , ) 0,  ( , )xy xyU x y U x y 1= =                (11) 
 
Now we will focus on a class of multiattribute utility functions where a prospect 
( , )x y is a least preferred prospect if either x  or is at its minimum value. This 
requirement places the following constraints on the utility function: 
y
 
 (12) min min min min min max min max( , ) ( , ) ( , ) 0     [ , ], [ , ]xy xy xyU x y U x y U x y x x x y y y= = = ∀ ∈ ∈
 
We will call the multiattribute utility functions that satisfy condition (12) attribute 
dominance utility functions since any attribute set at a minimum dominates the 
remaining attributes and sets the multiattribute utility function to a minimum. 
For attribute dominance utility functions we will define the marginal utility 
function over a single attribute, x , as the numerical value of the multiattribute utility 
function when all other attributes are set at their maximum values. I.e. for two 
attributes we have 
 
                                         (13) max( ) ( , )x xyU x U x y
 
Now we define a conditional utility function, U y , as | ( | )y x x
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=                      (14) 
A conditional utility function, U y , is the utility function for attribute  
when we are guaranteed a fixed amount of attribute 
| ( | )y x x y
x . The conditional utility function 
 is the path traced on the multiattribute utility function for different values 
of y and a fixed value of 
| ( | )y xU y x
x . Equation (14) shows that for attribute dominance utility 
functions, the minimum value of the conditional utility function, U y , is 
equal to zero and the maximum value, U y , is equal to one. The denominator 
in equation (14) thus serves as a normalizing term so a conditional utility function can 
be assessed directly from the decision maker on a scale of 0 to 1.  
| min( |y x x)
| m(y x ax | )x
Re-arranging equation (14) gives:  
 
 |( , ) ( ) ( | )xy x y xU x y U x U y x=                                    (15) 
 
In a similar manner, we can also define U x  as | ( | )x y y
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Combining equations (14) and (16), we have  
 
 ||
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y
U y x U x
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=                                    (17) 
 
Equation (17) provides a method to update our utility values over one attribute 
when we are guaranteed a fixed amount of another. We will call equation (17) Bayes’ 
rule for utility inference.  
Now define a joint utility density function, , over two attributes, 
and  as: 
( , )xyu x y
min max[ ,x x x∈ ] ]min max[ ,y y y∈
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where U x is the multiattribute utility function for the two attributes x  and y. ( , )xy y
From the properties of derivatives, the integral of a joint utility density function 
that is defined by equation (18) over a region ,a x b c y d≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  is  
 
    (19) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
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xy xy xy xy xy
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If we set a x  and , and if attribute dominance utility exists, then 
equation (19) reduces to 
min= minc y=
                               (20) 
min min
( , ) ( , )
y x
xy xy
y x
U x y u x y dxdy= ∫ ∫
 
Equation (20) illustrates how attribute dominance utility functions can be obtained 
by integrating a joint utility density function from the least preferred prospect to a 
prospect ( , )x y . This integral provides an analogy with joint cumulative distribution 
functions obtained by integrating a joint probability density function over the domain 
of the variables.  
We note that any general multiattribute utility function can be decomposed into a 
linear combination of attribute dominance utility functions. For example, re-
arranging equation (19) and using any general prospect b=x, d=y,  and 
 gives 
mina x=
minc y=
 
min min
min min min min( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )
y x
xy xy xy xy xy
y x
U x y U x y U x y U x y u x y dxdy= + − + ∫ ∫      (21) 
 
The terms U x  and U x are scaled attribute dominance utility 
functions of one dimension since the utility function is zero if that single attribute is 
set to a minimum, and the scaling constants are equal to U x  and 
 respectively.  
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Now we discuss the integral term 
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properties of a definite integral, minI x = =
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. In other words, this integral 
has a value of zero if either x or y is at the minimum value. Furthermore, this integral 
has a maximum value equal to xyk I= . Let us normalize this integral term 
and define C x y as ( , )
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min min
max max
( , )
( , )( , )
( ,
( , )
y x
xy
y x
y x
xy
y x
u x y dxdy
I x yC x y
I x y
u x y dxdy
=
∫ ∫
∫ ∫

)
y
                        (22) 
From equation (22), we note that C x y has the same mathematical properties as 
an attribute dominance utility function. In other words we can write 
( , )
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where are scaling constants and C x are 
normalized attribute dominance utility functions. 
, ,  and x y xk k k min min( , ), ( , ),  and ( , )y C x y C x y
Similarly, for three dimensions we can define  
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and therefore,  
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Once again we note that the terms U x , and 
are scaled attribute dominance utility functions of one dimension, 
is a scaled attribute dominance utility function 
of three dimensions, and that U x can be 
reduced to one dimensional and two dimensional attribute dominance utility functions 
using the arguments for the two dimensional case presented above.  
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In other words, we can write equation (25) as  
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Equation (26) expresses any general three-dimensional multiattribute utility 
function in terms of a linear combination of attribute dominance utility functions. By 
induction, we can show that the same formulation applies to higher dimensions.  
We note that a special case of decomposing utility functions into attribute 
dominance utility functions arises when the attributes have mutual utility 
independence and leads to the multilinear utility function. In order to see this, we 
recall the following theorem from about mutual utility independence [8].  
If two attributes, x and y, have mutual utility independence, their multiattribute 
utility function has the multilinear form 
 
                   (27) ( , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )xy y y x x xy x yU x y k U y k U x k U x U y= + +
where are constants, and U y are the utility 
functions of attributes y and x  respectively.  If we substitute for 
into (23) we note that (27), is indeed a special case.  
,  , and 1y x xy xk k k k k= − −
( ) ( )U x U y
( ) and ( )y U x
( , )C x y =
MAXIMUM ENTROPY ATTRIBUTE DOMINANCE UTILITY 
FUNCTIONS 
By analogy with joint probability density functions, we can now we extend the 
maximum entropy utility analysis using the joint utility density function that we have 
developed. For example, if the decision maker can provide only the marginal utility 
function for each attribute present, then the maximum entropy formulation maximizes 
the entropy of the joint utility density function subject to the given preference 
information constraints. If for example, we have two attributes x and y that are defined 
on the unit square, and we know the marginal utility functions, the formulation for the 
problem is 
  
1 1
1 0
1
0 0
1
0 0
1 1
0 0
max  ( , ) ln( ( , ))
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                                  (28) 
 
The solution to this problem provides a joint utility density function that is equal to 
the product of the marginal utility density functions.  
 
( , ) ( ) ( ),    0 1,0 1.x yu x y u x u y x y= ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤                            (29) 
 
The joint utility density function integrates, using equation (20), to  
 
( , ) ( ) ( ),    0 1,0 1.x yU x y U x U y x y= ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤                   (30) 
 
The product form of the utility density functions presented in equation (29) is the 
condition of utility independence that is analogous to probability independence and 
applies to any general class of multiattribute utility functions that have mutual utility 
independence. We can show this by substituting equation (27) into equation (18) to get 
 
 
2 ( , )( , ) ( ) ( )xy x y
U x yu x y k u x u y
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∂ =∂ ∂                              (31) 
If the marginal utility functions are known, the maximum entropy attribute 
dominance utility function assumes utility independence between the attributes. If 
more information is available about the utility function, such as moments, risk 
aversion coefficients, or utility dependence parameters, it can also be incorporated into 
the maximum entropy formulation and an attribute dominance utility function can be 
obtained by integration. We recall that the construction of any general multiattribute 
utility function involves the construction of several attribute dominance utility 
functions of different dimensions.  
RELATIVE ENTROPY 
The KL-distance (often known as the relative entropy or cross-entropy) is a 
measure of divergence between two probability distributions. In a similar manner, the 
KL-distance is a measure of the divergence between two utility density functions.  
The expression for the KL-distance between a utility density functions, u(x) and  
another utility density function q(x) is given as 
 
 ( )( ) ln( )
( )
u xKL distance u x
q x
− = ∫∫                           (32) 
The maximum entropy utility principle can now be generalized by analogy to a 
minimum cross-entropy utility principle by minimizing the KL-distance relative to a 
known target utility density function. This helps incorporate information about the 
shape of the utility function or its relation to a family of utility functions into the 
maximum entropy formulation.  
UTILITY DEPENDENCE: AN INFORMATION THEORETIC 
POINT OF VIEW 
In the previous sections we discussed the interpretation of the entropy and relative 
entropy as they apply to utility functions. In this section we discuss the interpretation 
of applying several measures of dependence that were developed in information theory 
into measurements of utility dependence. We provide some insights on their dual 
interpretations and an intuitive meaning for utility dependence that results from the 
analogy with joint probability functions. We start with the notion of conditional 
entropy.  
Conditional Entropy 
Having discussed a joint utility density function, and a conditional utility function, we 
can now define the conditional entropy of attribute Y given a guaranteed amount of 
attribute X as 
 
 ( | ) ( , ) ln( ( | ))h Y X u x y u y x= −∫∫ ,                           (33) 
where ( | ) ( | )x U y x
y
∂= ∂u y is the conditional utility density function of y for a given 
value of x.  
 
It is known from information theory that the conditional entropy is less than or 
equal to the marginal entropy, with equality if and only if the two variables are 
independent. I.e. 
 
 ( | ) ( )h Y X h Y≤ .                                (34) 
The interpretation for this result when applied to utility theory is that our utility 
functions for attributes have less entropy (become closer to aspiration utility functions) 
when conditioned on another attribute. However, when the two attributes are utility 
independent, the conditional entropy remains the same as the marginal entropy, since 
the utility functions for each attribute are not updated. 
Mutual Preference 
The notion of mutual information translates using the utility-probability analogy 
into mutual preference. In probability land, the mutual information between two 
variables is the KL-distance between their joint distribution and the product of their 
marginal distributions. The interpretation for the mutual information is the amount of 
information induced about a random variable, X, when we know the outcome of 
another random variable, Y.  
Let us now consider the two extreme cases of probabilistic dependence. The first 
case is when the two variables are independent. In this case we have a marginal 
probability distribution for each variable. Knowing the outcome of one variable, X, 
tells us nothing about the other variable Y, and so this knowledge does not update its 
probability distribution. Therefore the entropy of Y remains unchanged whether or not 
we know X. The second case is when the two variables are deterministically related 
through a functional expression. For example, Profit = 0.15*Revenue. In this case, 
knowledge of the Revenue tells us the exact value of profit. If we know revenue, the 
distribution of profit is updated to a step distribution function (or an impulse 
probability density function) at that particular value of profit. The entropy of the 
updated distribution of X is reduced to negative infinity (it is now deterministic) once 
we know the outcome of Y. The mutual information between the two variables in this 
case is infinite as knowledge of one variable provides infinite reduction in the entropy 
of the other.  
Now we consider the analogous interpretation of mutual information when applied 
to utility, which we call mutual preference. If we have a prospect with two attributes, 
we have a utility function for each attribute. Now we consider two extreme cases. The 
first is when the attributes have utility independence. If we are now guaranteed a fixed 
amount of one attribute, it does not change our utility function over the other (by 
definition of utility independence), and therefore this guarantee does not change its 
entropy. The mutual preference between the attributes is therefore equal to zero. On 
the other hand, the attributes may be deterministically related. Once again, we 
consider the example Profit = 0.15*Revenue. In this case, if we are guaranteed a fixed 
amount of Revenue, say 0R , then we automatically set a reference point for our 
satisfaction with profit, 00.15* R . Any value of profit that is below 00.15* R  will be 
unsatisfactory for us while any value of profit that is above 00.15* R  will be 
satisfactory. In other words, we now have a step (aspiration) utility function (or an 
impulse utility density function) for profit. A guarantee of the Revenue attribute has 
sharpened our utility function for profit and it is now a target or aspiration level. The 
mutual preference between the two attributes is thus infinite since guarantee of one 
attribute reduces the entropy in the utility function of the other to its minimum value 
of negative infinity.  
AXIOMATIC JUSTIFICATION OF THE MAXIMUM ENTROPY 
UTILITY PRINCIPLE  
We have discussed the maximum entropy utility principle and the application of 
several measures of information theory to utility theory. In this section we further 
draw on this analogy to provide an axiomatic derivation for the maximum entropy 
utility principle. Shore and Johnson [9] showed that Jaynes’ maximum entropy 
principle for probability inference satisfies a set of reasonable axioms that stem from 
one fundamental principle: if a problem can be solved in more than one way, the 
results should be consistent. They also showed that maximizing any function but the 
entropy will lead to inconsistencies in these axioms unless that function and the 
entropy have identical maxima (any monotonic function of the entropy will work). 
The analogy between probability and utility density functions that we have developed 
allows the application of their analysis directly to the maximum entropy utility 
principle. Now we will mention each of the axioms and discuss how they relate to 
utility assignment.  
 
Axiom 1: Uniqueness 
The utility values that we assign by maximum entropy utility should be unique. The 
justification for this is that if we do not have unique utility values, we are vulnerable to 
being a “money pump” (as discussed earlier). Another justification for the uniqueness 
of the maximum entropy utility assignment is that if we solve the utility assignment 
problem twice in exactly the same way, we expect the same utility values to be 
assigned in both times.  
 
Axiom 2: Invariance 
We should expect the same utility values from the maximum entropy utility 
principle when we solve the problem in two different coordinate systems. For 
example, if a utility density function is assigned in Cartesian co-ordinates and 
integrate to get a multiattribute utility function, we should get the same results if we 
solve the problem in polar coordinates and integrate over the domain of the polar 
coordinates to get a utility function.  
Axiom 3: System Independence 
Consider two independent utility functions or two attributes that have utility 
independence. If we receive information about the two attributes, then we would like 
the joint utility density function that is assigned to be equal to the product of the 
individual utility density functions (implying utility independence as discussed above). 
 
Axiom 4: Subset Independence 
This axiom concerns itself with situations where we receive preference information 
about the conditional utility functions in attribute dominance utility. One way of 
accounting for this new information is to update the conditional utility functions 
U(B|A) individually. Another way is to marginalize the attribute dominance utility 
function to get U(B) and then apply the new preference information to U(B). The 
results should be consistent in both cases.  
As mentioned above, if these axioms are required by a utility assignment 
mechanism, then maximizing any function but the entropy will lead to inconsistencies 
in these axioms unless that function and the entropy have identical maxima.  
In addition to satisfying the previous axioms, the maximum entropy utility 
principle satisfies two essential desiderata. The first desideratum, as mentioned earlier, 
is that for different people with the same order of preferences for the prospects and 
where we have the same preference information we should assign the same utility 
values. The second desideratum is -utility and probability independence- that results 
from the foundations of normative utility theory. The utility value of a prospect should 
not depend on the probability of getting that prospect due to the normative separation 
of beliefs from preferences [10]. 
CONCLUSIONS 
   In this paper we have provided an analogy between probability and utility and 
built on the notion of a utility density function to a joint utility density function for 
multiple attributes.  We applied concepts of information theory to utility theory and 
gained insights on the notions of utility dependence and aspiration utility functions. 
The analogy between probability and utility provides several directions for future 
research. For example, analogous interpretations for Cox’s axioms provide the basis 
for an axiomatic derivation of utility inference. The algebra of probable inference 
translates to the algebra of preferences for logical operations on the attributes. The 
idea of Influence diagrams as graphical representations of joint probability 
distributions [11] extends to the notion of utility diagrams, which are graphical 
representations of multiattribute utility functions and express the dependence relations 
between the attributes. The method of copulas for constructing joint cumulative 
distribution functions translates into a method for constructing attribute dominance 
utility where the dependence parameters can be determined by the trade-off 
coefficients between the attributes. Assessing utility moments and utility cross-
correlation coefficients can also be used to construct a multiattribute utility function. 
Interchanging utility functions with probability functions provides a wealth of new 
results and insights. For example, the notion of utility dominance is the analog of 
stochastic dominance [12]. 
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